The study of strategic leaders represents one of the more enduring areas of strategic management research (e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) . In addressing the importance of strategic leaders within the organizational landscape, Sutton and Callahan (1987: 406) note that "images of organizations and their leaders are intertwined." Similarly, Hambrick and Mason (1984: 194) write that strategic leaders "matter" in organizations (for reviews of this literature, see Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004; Certo, Lester, Dalton, & Dalton, in press ).
Notably, the majority of studies in this area focus on the outcomes generated by leaders, as compared to the accountability of leaders for organizational outcomes. For example, a significant stream of research investigates the influence of strategic leader characteristics and governance structures on firm performance (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998) . Relatively fewer studies have examined how firm performance influences leadership changes. 1 Our objective in this study is to examine the impact of material financial restatements on firms' leadership structures. Not only are financial restatements an important feature in the corporate landscape, but they also represent a unique opportunity to study the accountability of leaders for organizational outcomes, independent of firm performance. In contrast to bankruptcy and firm failure, which are inextricably linked to performance problems, restatements represent an organizational crisis that is primarily socio-legal in nature. Over the course of the 1990s, firms across all performance levels increasingly engaged in a variety of so-called "accounting irregularities," presumably to gain and maintain their legitimacy in the face of mounting market pressures. Certain firms were particularly aggressive in this regard, leading to a series of very public corporate accounting scandals (e.g., Enron, WorldCom) that, in turn, led to a public outcry for accounting reform. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 officially marked the "changing of the 1 One notable exception is the CEO succession literature, which has shown that CEO turnover is more likely following a period of poor firm performance (e.g., Gilson & Vetsuypens, 1993; Warner, Watts, & Wruck, 1988) .
tide" with respect to legal and social attitudes toward non-GAAP financial reporting. As evidenced by the continuing rise in the number of financial restatements announced each year, firms are still responding to this dramatic redefinition of accepted accounting practices.
Such shifts in institutional logic constitute a legitimacy crisis for firms (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) , who must either defend themselves against legitimacy loss or risk the continued support of key stakeholders (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Suchman, 1995) . Although prior research has demonstrated that strategic leaders are frequently punished through job loss as a defense against the legitimacy threat posed by firm failure (e.g., Gilson & Vetsuypens, 1993; Warner et al., 1988) , it is not a forgone conclusion that turnover will be equally prevalent following crises not directly linked with poor performance. Both practically and theoretically, it is important to ascertain whether removal of the firm's top executives and directors is also viewed as a viable protection against legitimacy loss when the crisis is primarily socio-legal in nature. In other words, is it the nature or the severity of the legitimacy threat that matters most?
To address this question, we examine the relationship between a firm's material financial restatement and changes in key officer and director positions in the two years immediately following the restatement event. As a unique form of corporate failure (e.g., Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann, & Hambrick, in press ), restatements pose a serious threat to organizational legitimacy. We therefore propose that restatement firms will be likely to seek the removal of leaders associated with the restatement in order to mitigate any negative effects on the firm itself.
While poor performance may be attributed to a wide variety of causes both internal and external to the firm, the material misstatement of financial information is indicative of intentional, manipulative, or even fraudulent behavior. In other words, financial restatements may be traced to definitive actions and actors within the firm, providing more visible targets for blame.
We also examine which leaders suffer personal losses following restatement events.
Financial restatements indicate likely failures in corporate governance and may therefore taint (Wiesenfeld et al., in press ) the top executives most directly responsible for the firm's financial reporting process, i.e., the chief executive (CEO) and chief financial (CFO) officers. The bodies tasked with oversight of these managers (i.e., board of directors and audit committee) may also incur stigma and be likely to experience turnover following a restatement event. If the severity of the legitimacy threat is indeed the primary determinant of turnover as an organizational response, then such "settling up" (Fama, 1980) will likely be evident across multiple leadership groups. Or we may find that turnover is more narrowly targeted. Regardless, our findings will provide important insights into the settling up process in the internal labor market, as opposed to prior research that has developed the role of settling up externally (Wiesenfeld et al., in press ).
Lastly, we explore whether turnover following a material financial restatement varies based on distinctions in the severity of the event. We suggest that restatement events prompted by external parties (e.g., independent auditors, Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC]) represent a more serious threat to legitimacy and will therefore be associated with higher levels of turnover than restatement events prompted from within the company itself. Similarly, we hypothesize that negative stock market reactions to restatement announcements will be associated with subsequent turnover. Suchman (1995: 574) defines organizational legitimacy as the "generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions." Legitimacy is important to organizations because of the access it provides to key resources (e.g., Parsons, 1960; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) . Stakeholders are more likely to associate with groups deemed proper and appropriate and to support organizations that embody prevailing social norms and values.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Legitimate organizations are viewed as inherently more trustworthy (Suchman, 1995) ; this trust can, in turn, be leveraged to facilitate increased access to resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) .
In contrast, even the threat of loss of legitimacy can disrupt the flow of necessary resources into the firm. As noted by Suchman (1995) , the negative effects of firm failure are felt even more acutely when legitimacy is at stake. External constituents are likely to distance themselves from organizations suffering legitimacy losses to avoid the risk of "negative contagion"-taking with them the financial, social, and intellectual capital that the damaged firm needs to recover and survive (Suchman, 1995: 597) . As Deephouse and Carter (2005: 333) note:
"Organizations that deviate from normal behaviour violate cultural or legal expectations and theories of organizing. They are subject to legitimacy challenges and may be deemed unacceptable by stakeholders."
Financial Restatements and Organizational Legitimacy
We focus on material financial restatements, which by definition are a function of significant accounting problems within the firm. These are not routine financial restatements resulting from changes in accounting procedures or bookkeeping errors. Rather, these restatements are identified by the General Accounting Office (GAO) as resulting from "aggressive" accounting practices, misuse of facts, oversight or misinterpretation of accounting rules, and fraud (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003: 4) . In these firms, a material misstatement has passed undetected by internal control mechanisms as well as the external auditors certifying the issuance of the original statements. Only later is the misstatement discovered, and the revised financials released (Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2004; Eilifsen & Messier, 2000) . In short, the restatements of interest in this study are relatively rare occurrences that signal severe shortcomings in both internal and external governance mechanisms.
Material financial restatements often represent, "...a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain" (Schipper, 1989: 92; also Healy & Wahlen, 1999) . This concept of manipulation distinguishes these restatements from other types of firm crises, such as bankruptcy or poor firm performance. Poor performance may result from leaders' honest mistakes or external environmental factors, whereas restatements tend to involve intentional actions taken by firm leaders. Financial restatements therefore constitute a more direct breach of stakeholder trust. They threaten a firm's regulatory legitimacy (e.g., Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Ruef & Scott, 1998; Scott, 1995) by revealing violations of the legal standards imposed by the SEC (e.g., Deephouse & Carter, 2005) . Restatements also diminish normative legitimacy (e.g., Parsons, 1960; Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995) , insofar as they reveal the firm to have violated societal expectations of proper conduct.
An example may help to illustrate the negative effects of material financial restatements.
The SEC charged that Rite Aid, the third largest U.S. retail drugstore chain, engaged in "faulty, inappropriate, and misleading" accounting practices, including the incorrect expensing of vendor allowances, not recognizing expenses in the period they were incurred, and misrepresenting lease obligations. The effect on net income for their 1998 restatement was a restated annual net loss of $165.2 million. Prior to the restatement announcement (early 1999), Rite Aid stock traded between $40 to $50 per share; this value fell to a low of $3.06 by October 2000 when the company filed its amended annual report. In addition, Rite Aid's credit rating was downgraded, and its independent auditor resigned, citing lack of trust in data provided by the company. A securities class-action lawsuit was filed against the company, and several senior officers faced civil and criminal charges (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003) . The collective gravity of these penalties indicates that financial restatements are viewed as a serious breach of public trust.
Financial Restatements and Leader Turnover
Given the self-reinforcing nature of the legitimacy-resource relationship (Suchman, 1995) , theory suggests that firms are likely to take decisive action to defend their legitimacy and thereby ensure continued access to key resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) . One of the primary ways in which firms accomplish this is through targeted changes to their organizational structure.
Restructuring can take one of two main forms. Disassociation engages "structural change to symbolically distance the organization from 'bad influences'" (Suchman, 1995: 598) . For example, executive succession is often used to signal the firm's commitment to change (e.g., Gephart, 1978; Pfeffer, 1981; Suchman, 1995; Weber, 1978) . A second type of restructuring, creating or revamping monitors and watchdogs, involves changes to oversight functions to demonstrate a commitment to preventing future recurrences (Suchman, 1995) . Neither of these organizational changes directly repairs legitimacy damage, but each represents a key means by which firms may "symbolize contrition...and persuade some constituents that they can safely resume pragmatic exchanges with the troubled organization" (Suchman, 1995: 598) .
Executive turnover. One of the main responsibilities of the executive leadership is to establish and maintain the organization's legitimacy as perceived by stakeholders (Selznick, 1957) . One of the ways they accomplish this is by serving as symbols of the organization and its successes and failures (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) . When organizations thrive, we celebrate the power of leadership to effect organizational outcomes. When organizations falter, executives make convenient scapegoats whose removal appears to "fix" the problem. Disassociating executives from the firm communicates the organization's willingness to accede to external demands. In fact, the mere intent to comply, as signaled by executive turnover, may itself be enough to relieve the pressure on the organization (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) .
One concept that helps explain why executive replacement is such an attractive and powerful means of legitimacy restoration is that of stigma (e.g., Wiesenfeld et al., in press ). The executives in office at the time of the restatement are inextricably linked to the restatement by virtue of their physical proximity, temporal connection, and positional authority (Cannella, Fraser, Lee, & Semadeni, 2002; Goffman, 1963; Tetlock, 1985) . This results in their being stigmatized, or discredited, by association with the restatement event. Removing the stigmatized leaders, then, serves as an important means of mitigating the stigma attached to the firm. It helps to sort out the "intertwined" images of organizations and their leaders (Sutton & Callahan, 1987: 406) by symbolically placing blame on the leadership (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and removing "bad influences" from the organization (Suchman, 1995: 598) .
Several studies have documented the stigmatization process, as well as its devastating effects on managers' subsequent careers, in the context of poor financial performance, (e.g., Daily & Dalton, 1995; D'Aveni, 1989; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1992) . Research has also shown that CEO turnover is significantly higher in firms experiencing poor performance (Gilson & Vetsuypens, 1993; Schwartz & Menon, 1985; Warner et al., 1988; Weisbach, 1988) . Moreover, stock markets tend to respond favorably to executive changes in financially distressed firms (Bonnier & Bruner, 1989; Davidson, Worrell, & Dutia, 1993) .
Although poor performance may damage organizational legitimacy at some level, we propose that financial restatements represent a particularly serious threat to legitimacy, especially with respect to the regulatory and normative environments. Because the executives of the firm are held directly responsible for restatements, we suggest that removing these stigmatized leaders aids the firm's recovery process. Wiesenfeld et al. (in press ), for example, highlight the fact that economic arbiters (e.g., transaction partners) will take into account the qualities of leaders when making decisions. As such, removing stigmatized executives may help the firm maintain existing, and develop new, relationships with these arbiters.
We examine the likelihood of CEO and CFO turnover following a restatement event, as these are the internal strategic leaders most directly responsible for the firm's financial health. In fact, regulatory bodies view the CEO and CFO as equally accountable for certifying the financial condition of the firm; by law, both officers are required to certify firms' quarterly and annual reports with the SEC (see House of Representatives, 2002 for the complete Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
We therefore posit that the CEO and CFO constitute the two executive positions most likely to be held accountable in the case of a restatement, and that they are consequently more likely to experience turnover than their counterparts in a sample of control firms.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Restatement firms will be more likely to experience CEO turnover as compared to control firms.

Hypothesis 2 (H2). Restatement firms will be more likely to experience CFO turnover as compared to control firms.
Director turnover. Whereas executive turnover provides an example of legitimacy restoration by disassociation, turnover among directors best illustrates legitimacy restoration through monitoring and watchdog changes (Suchman, 1995) . Boards of directors are widely considered "the first line of defense against management wrongdoing" (Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 2002: 16) . Consistent with agency theory, directors are responsible for effective oversight of firm managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . In public corporations where ownership and management are disparate, managers may have both the inclination and opportunity to pursue their own interests at the expense of shareholders' concerns. An appropriately configured and active board should mitigate this tendency, but according to Arthur Levitt (former SEC chairman), boards have been failing to exercise this "gatekeeping" role properly (Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 2002: 3).
As a result, board member turnover may further assist the firm in restoring legitimacy following a restatement. By definition, financial restatements indicate that directors have failed to effectively monitor the firm's management with respect to accounting practices (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . Replacing these board members may serve two important purposes. Firstly, director turnover signals the firm's commitment to preventing future recurrences of similar problems (Suchman, 1995) . Secondly, bringing in new directors may help to re-establish important links with the external environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) .
Evidence exists that directors are frequently disciplined for organizational crises. Board member turnover, for example, has been shown to increase in corporations experiencing poor performance (Boeker & Goodstein, 1991; Crutchley, Garner & Marshall, 2002) , especially in cases where the firm experiences a CEO succession (Gilson, 1990) . Similarly, Gales and Kesner (1994) found a decline in the number of outside board members following a bankruptcy filing.
As noted previously, however, restatements allow us to study director turnover as a response to a serious legitimacy threat, when controlling for financial performance. We therefore expect to find that outside director turnover will also be higher in firms that file a financial restatement.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Restatement firms will be more likely to experience outside director turnover as compared to control firms.
Audit committee turnover. While director turnover theoretically provides a useful means of legitimacy repair, effecting director turnover may be difficult. Many boards of directors operate as classified boards where directors serve staggered terms (typically three years). Unless directors have been negligent in their duties of loyalty and care, it is difficult to remove a director prior to the end of his or her term. This is not necessarily true of board committees, however, as a director may be removed from a committee without being removed from the board.
The distinction between board and committee turnover is an important one. Many board decisions occur within committees (Daily, 1996) . While this does not relieve the board-at-large of its fiduciary responsibility, committees provide an efficient structure for utilizing directors' expertise and time. One of the more common and powerful committees is the audit committee (Daily, 1996; Kesner, 1988 An appropriately configured audit committee may help firms to avoid a restatement. For example, Defond and Jiambalvo (1991) found that firms involved in a financial restatement were less likely to have an audit committee than firms not restating. Studies have also found a negative relationship between the occurrence of a restatement and audit committee independence (Abbott et al., 2004; Klein, 2002) and activity level, as well as in firms where the audit committee includes at least one member with financial expertise (Abbott et al., 2004). 3 Collectively, these studies provide useful insights into the role of the audit committee as a specialized "watchdog" of the firm's financial activity. When a restatement occurs, regulators and investors may lose faith in the audit committee members in particular. Replacing these individuals may help to restore confidence in the efficacy of oversight by the audit committee.
Hypothesis 4 (H4). Restatement firms will be more likely to experience audit committee turnover as compared to control firms.
Restatement Prompter
Executive and director turnover in restatement firms may be more pronounced when the restatement is prompted by parties external to the firm (e.g., SEC or external auditors), as compared to firm management (Anderson & Yohn, 2002; Kinney & McDaniel, 1989) . The term "restatement" means that the original financial reports have already passed through the companies' internal control mechanisms, the external auditors, and have been processed by the SEC. In other words, none of these parties detected or reported the accounting irregularities the first time through. Once they become aware of organizational activities necessitating a restatement, however, all three are legally required to disclose this knowledge (Jorgenson, 2004) .
A large proportion of the restatements documented by the GAO were prompted by the companies themselves (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2002). In these cases, the accounting irregularities may have been discovered by the firm's management, board, or audit committee.
The problems may have even been first noticed by the external auditor, who brought them to the audit committee's attention, which in turn instituted corrective action. Restatements are attributed to the external auditor only after the auditor brings the issue to the audit committee and deems that the committee has failed to take appropriate remedial steps. Auditors are then legally required to disclose the information to the SEC (Jorgenson, 2004) . This means that restatements prompted by the SEC have passed twice through the company's internal controls and the external auditors, and are detected as a result of the SEC's own investigative activities.
Restatements prompted by either the external auditor or the SEC should therefore pose a particularly serious threat to the regulatory legitimacy of the organization. Such action by external parties means that the leadership of the firm has twice failed to either detect or disclose the improper accounting practices, suggesting either a severe lack of oversight or the conscious intent to deceive (Richardson, Tuna, & Wu, 2003) . It also places the firm under the direct scrutiny of regulators, making any future missteps especially hazardous to the organization's well-being. Accordingly, we propose that restatements prompted by external agents represent such a serious breach of public trust that swift and strong reactions to restore legitimacy will be necessary. We hypothesize that restatement firms will be more likely to both disassociate themselves from their CEOs and CFOs, and also to revamp their monitoring functions through board and audit committee turnover, when the restatement is prompted externally.
Hypothesis 5a (H5a). Firms whose restatement is externally prompted will be more likely to experience CEO turnover than firms where the restatement is prompted internally. Hypothesis 5b (H5b). Firms whose restatement is externally prompted will be more likely to experience CFO turnover than firms where the restatement is prompted internally. Hypothesis 5c (H5c). Firms whose restatement is externally prompted will be more likely to experience outside director turnover than firms where the restatement is prompted internally.
Hypothesis 5d (H5d). Firms whose restatement is externally prompted will be more likely to experience audit committee turnover than firms where the restatement is prompted internally.
Market Reaction
As noted previously, financial restatements diminish an organization's social or normative legitimacy (e.g., Parsons, 1960; Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995) , in addition to any damage done to the firm's credibility with the SEC. Although the social environment encompasses a wide variety of audiences who are not necessarily shareholders, by examining market reactions we can gauge how the social audiences most directly affected by a firm's actions (e.g., the investment community) perceive the restatement event. Notably, several studies have reported abnormal returns following restatement announcements ranging from -4.2 to -11 percent over approximately a 2-day window (Agrawal & Chadha, in press; Palmrose, Richardson, & Scholz, 2004; Richardson et al., 2003) . Similarly, the U.S. GAO (2003) reported that restating firms (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) collectively incurred about $100 billion in market-adjusted losses in market capitalization immediately following the announcement, and up to $240 billion over the first 60 days after. Collectively, these findings suggest that restatements are not an accepted feature of the social landscape: …evidence suggests that these announcements and the questions they raise about certain corporate accounting practices may negatively impact overall investor confidence... Investors generally believe that the growing number of restatements is symptomatic of a larger, more pervasive problem… (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003: 32).
As evidence of this impact, Wu (2002) found that quarterly earnings announcements and share prices ceased to be related following a restatement (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003); indicating lost confidence in the financial information released by the company. Ironically, restatements are often the result of earnings manipulations undertaken for exactly the opposite reason-to create a favorable impression of the firm in the capital market in order to garner increased access to financial resources (e.g., Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Richardson et al., 2003) .
Nevertheless, investor reactions may vary among different restatement events. We therefore posit that a negative market reaction serves as an indicator that the firm's social legitimacy is at particular risk. In other words, negative stock market reactions denote a more severe stigma attached to the firms' leaders. Consequently, restatement firms should be more likely to experience turnover through both disassociation (CEOs and CFOs) and changes in monitoring function (directors and audit committee members), when the restatement is greeted by a negative stock market reaction. were excluded, as they did not disclose any new or meaningful data to the market.
Hypothesis 6a (H6a
We focused on firms filing a restatement from January 1, 1998 through December 31, 1999 as it allowed us to develop a control sample of firms not involved in a financial restatement for the year prior to, and the period of, the study. This time frame also ensured that any turnover noted was not in response to the collapse of Enron (December 2001) or the subsequent passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002). We felt this approach was warranted given the breadth of the effects of both events on corporate governance practices. We further excluded firms filing multiple restatements and firms where the GAO database failed to identify the restatement prompt, as well as firms where a suitable match was not available and firms with missing data (e.g., lack of SEC filings). This left us with a final sample of 116 restatement firms. Each restatement firm was matched with a control firm based on industry and firm size, for an overall sample of 232 firms. None of the control firms issued a restatement during the study period.
While a matched-pair sampling design has limitations, it is generally considered an appropriate way to study phenomena with a low base rate of occurrence (e.g., Cannella, Fraser, & Lee, 1995; Daily, 1996; Daily & Dalton, 1994a , 1994b D'Aveni, 1989; Gales & Kesner, 1994; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988) . Accordingly, we matched each restatement firm with a firm not issuing a restatement across the same time period using 4-digit SIC codes to indicate industry (e.g., Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988) and total assets to indicate firm size (e.g., Cannella et al., 1995; D'Aveni, 1989) . We generated a list of three potential matches for each firm, and utilized the best match with the most complete data for the period of interest. Similar matching processes have been utilized in other studies of restatement events (e.g., Agrawal, Jaffee, & Karpoff, 1999; Khanna & Poulsen, 1995; Kinney, Palmrose, & Scholz, 2004; Richardson et al., 2003) . To ensure equivalency, we tested the similarity of the two samples in terms of assets, sales, log of assets, log of sales, return on assets, stock market returns, and ownership structure. We found no statistically significant differences between the samples on any of these dimensions.
We tested the hypotheses using four event history datasets based on the different types of individuals addressed in our study (e.g., CEOs, CFOs, directors, and audit committee members).
Because we were able to determine the month of departure for the executives in our sample, we updated CEO and CFO turnover monthly. We created the CEO and CFO data sets by tracking each executive for the twenty-four month period following the restatement announcement.
We were not able to identify the month of turnover for directors and audit committee members, however, as changes in directorships are typically reported only in the annual proxy filing. As a result, the director and audit committee datasets were each updated annually. For each firm, we recorded board and audit committee structure in the proxy statement preceding the restatement event. We then tracked each outside director and audit committee member through three subsequent proxy statements. Because both the restatement and proxy dates varied by firm, directors in the final sample were tracked for actual time periods ranging between two to three calendar years after the restatement event.
The analyses for the effects of restatement prompter and market reaction were run relying on the subsample of restatement firms only. This approach was appropriate given that the hypotheses required a test of differences among restatement firms, as compared to differences between restatement and control firms.
Primary Variables
We created a dichotomous dependent variable to test the hypotheses regarding CEO, CFO, outside director, and audit committee turnover. Given the event history nature of the data, individuals received an updated value denoting their employment status. Individuals retaining their positions in a period were assigned a value of "0", while those who turned over were assigned a value of "1". Executive turnover was updated monthly, while director turnover was updated annually. The primary independent variable was a dummy variable, restatement. Firms filing restatements during the study period (half of the total sample) were coded as "1", and their matched counterparts (control firms) were coded as "0".
Restatements were prompted either internally (by the firm's officers or directors) or externally (by external auditors or the SEC). We represented this using a dummy variable, external prompt, that was coded as "1" for firms where the restatement was prompted by external parties and "0" for firms where the restatement was prompted from within. Each of these subsamples represented approximately half of the total number of restatement firms.
To further examine heterogeneity among restatement firms, we measured the market reaction to each restatement announcement. We used Eventus to calculate cumulative abnormal market-adjusted returns (using the CRSP equally-weighted index). We estimated the market model using a 255-day window ending 46 days prior to the event. The event window began the day prior to and ended the day after the restatement event. We included the day after the restatement in the event window because some of these announcements may have occurred after stock market trading closed for the day . The average abnormal return was approximately -11 percent, which is similar to Palmrose et al.'s (2004) finding of -9 percent.
Control Variables
Organizational controls. Given the event history nature of the data, the following organizational controls were updated annually. Return on assets (ROA), a widely used indicator of firm performance in succession research, was measured as the firm's net income divided by total assets (Shen & Cannella, 2002a) . As an alternative performance measure, stock return was calculated as the firm's cumulative annual stock return and included reinvested dividends (Shen & Cannella, 2002b) , using CRSP's database of monthly stock returns. Both ROA and stock return were lagged to reflect firm performance in the prior year. Sales growth was measured as the annual change in firm revenues (Mishina, Pollock, & Porac, 2004) . Firm size was measured as the natural log of the firm's total assets (Cannella & Shen, 2001) . CEO duality may also influence executive turnover (Shen & Cannella, 2002b; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004) . Duality was coded as "1" when a CEO also served as chairperson of the board, and "0" otherwise.
We also included two organizational control variables that were measured in the year prior to the restatement and did not vary over time. Ownership concentration may influence firm outcomes such as turnover (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003) . Accordingly, outside ownership was measured as the percentage of equity owned by outside blockholders (Sanders & Carpenter, 2003) . The vigilance of a firm's board of directors may likewise influence executive turnover; outside directors was calculated by dividing the number of independent, outside directors by board size (Daily & Dalton, 1994a ; see also, Ocasio, 1994; Shen & Cannella, 2002b) .
Individual controls. In addition, we included several variables to control for differences among individuals. Research suggests that an individual's tenure with an organization serves as a proxy for power and may influence turnover (Ocasio, 1994; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003) .
Organizational tenure was measured by taking the natural log of one plus the individual's tenure with the organization. An individual's stock ownership serves as another proxy for power and may also influence turnover (Shen & Cannella, 2002b) . Executive ownership denotes the percentage of firm equity held by the focal executive. Age (Ocasio, 1994; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004 ) is measured as the natural log of the individual's age in years.
Director controls. The analyses examining director and audit committee turnover included additional control variables. Outside members refers to the number of outside (nonmanagement) directors sitting on the firm's board. Audit members refers to the number of audit committee members. We utilized year dummy variables to better understand the dynamics of director/audit committee turnover over time.
Analytical Techniques
We relied on two analytical techniques to test our hypotheses. For the executive turnover hypotheses, we were able to identify the month of executive succession and constructed the data set accordingly. We then utilized Cox regression analysis, the most common approach for analyzing duration data (Singer & Willett, 2003; Yamaguchi, 1991) , to model the impact of restatement events on the time to executive exit. The primary advantage of Cox regression analysis is that it is not necessary to specify the role of time in the analysis (Singer & Willett, 2003) . Given that Cox regression analysis assumes that population hazard functions are proportional (Singer & Willett, 2003) , we used Stata's test of Schoenfeld residuals to confirm that the data did not violate this assumption.
Because we were unable to determine the month in which the directors and audit committee members turned over, we constructed these data sets consisting of director/audit committee member-year observations. Because years are less fine-grained than months as time periods, we relied on discrete-time event history analysis (i.e., logistic regression) to test the hypotheses regarding director and audit committee turnover.
RESULTS
The descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for the executive dataset are based on one observation per executive in the month of the restatement event (see Table 1 ). 4 Our final executive sample consists of 238 CEOs and 199 CFOs. 5 Table 2 - 4 In an effort to conserve space, we report only the summary statistics and correlations for the executive dataset. The summary statistics and correlations for the director and audit committee member datasets are available from the authors upon request. 5 The number of CEOs and CFOs does not exactly match our total number of firms because some firms had multiple CEOs, while other firms did not have a CFO. In supplementary analyses, we included a dummy variable denoting whether or not a firm had multiple CEOs, and it did not substantively influence the results.
--------------------------------------Insert Tables 1 & 2 about here ---------------------------------------
The tests of the hypotheses regarding executive turnover (H1-H2, H5a-b, H6a-b) appear in Table 3 . To ease interpretation of the results, we report hazard ratios as opposed to coefficients. Models 1 and 2 display the results of the tests of H1 and H2, respectively. The hazard ratio for the restatement dummy variable is greater than 1.000 and significant (p < .001) in both models. Therefore, the effect of restatement is to increase the likelihood of turnover. Both CEOs (hazard ratio = 2.345, Model 1) and CFOs (hazard ratio = 2.054, Model 2) of restatement firms are more than twice as likely as their counterparts in control firms to experience turnover. Both H1 and H2 are supported.
Models 3 and 4 display the results of the tests of H5a and H5b, which posit that the prompter of the restatement will be associated with CEO and CFO turnover, respectively.
Contrary to prediction, the external prompt dummy variable is not statistically significant; we did not observe a difference in the relationship between executive turnover and restatements that were externally versus internally prompted.
The results for H6a-b are noted in Models 5 and 6. We find partial support for these hypotheses. Stock market reaction is significantly (p < .01) related to CFO turnover in Model 6, and weakly (p < .10) related to CEO turnover in Model 5. Thus, H6b is supported, suggesting that the stock market response to the restatement announcement influences CFO turnover.
---------------------------------------
Insert Table 3 
about here ---------------------------------------
The results of the tests of director and audit committee turnover are displayed in Table 4; we report results in odds ratios to ease interpretation. Model 1 displays the results of the test of H3 regarding director turnover following a restatement event. In support of this hypothesis, the restatement dummy variable is significant (p < .01). The odds ratio of 1.652 indicates that directors of restatement firms are over 65 percent more likely to experience turnover than their counterparts in the set of control firms. Model 2 (odds ratio of 1.684) indicates that audit committee members are nearly 70 percent more likely to experience turnover than their counterparts in the set of control firms, supporting H4 (p < .001).
Model 3 displays the results of H5c. External prompt was significantly (p < .05) related to director turnover, but in the opposite direction as we hypothesized. External prompt was not related to audit committee turnover (Model 4, H5d). Thus, we find no support for our hypotheses suggesting that firms with restatements prompted externally are more likely to experience director turnover as compared to firms with restatements prompted internally.
Models 5 and 6 display the results corresponding to H6c and H6d, which suggest that stock market reaction will influence director and audit committee member turnover. Stock market reaction was weakly related to outside director turnover (.213; p < .10) and unrelated to audit committee turnover (.353; ns) . Based on these results, the hypotheses are not supported. Table 4 about here
DISCUSSION
As predicted, restatement firms were significantly more likely to experience turnover of their CEOs, CFOs, outside directors, and audit committee members following the restatement announcement, compared to a sample of control firms. Practically speaking, stakeholders may find it satisfying that the leaders of firms that restate their financials are more than twice as likely to lose their jobs than their non-restatement counterparts. The executives and directors in charge at the time of the announcement are indeed held accountable and incur some degree of personal loss; "settling up" (Fama, 1980) does occur in the immediate, internal labor market following a financial restatement. This finding is consistent with both institutional theory and the process of stigmatization as developed by Wiesenfeld et al. (in press ). Presumably, a material financial restatement represents a serious threat to organizational legitimacy, which in turn threatens the organization's access to critical resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) . As a result, firms are likely to act swiftly and strongly to repair the legitimacy breach, by making targeted organizational changes to signal their contrition and commitment to reform (Suchman, 1995) . Specifically, firms may seek to disassociate themselves from their leadership, through turnover, as a means of mitigating the stigma that might otherwise attach to the firm (Wiesenfeld et al., in press ).
It should be noted that we were not able to establish a causal link between restatement events and job loss as punishment. Companies often couch involuntary departures in nicesounding clichés (i.e., an executive "retires"), making it nearly impossible to determine the true reason for turnover. The data are nevertheless suggestive in this regard. First, we measured executive and director departures occurring after the restatement announcement only. The strategic leaders in our study were therefore already stigmatized by virtue of their association with the restatement event (Cannella et al., 2002; Goffman, 1963; Tetlock, 1985) , minimizing any benefits of voluntary departure. For example, prior research has demonstrated that executives/directors of bankruptcy firms can avoid subsequent devaluation in the external labor market, but only if they leave prior to the bankruptcy announcement (Gilson, 1989) . Second, the dramatic difference in turnover rates indicates that there are likely much more significant forces at work than just the opportunistic desire to flee a "sinking ship." This is further underscored by the concentration of executive turnover in the first 12 months following the restatement announcement, demonstrating a close temporal relationship between the two events (Table 2 ). In contrast, the insignificant effects of time displayed in Table 4 suggest that director turnover was less concentrated in the initial year following the restatement. This was likely a function of the staggered nature of most board terms.
The widespread nature of leadership turnover in restatement firms further supports our contention that restatements represent a potent threat to organizational legitimacy. Job loss is neither confined to the CEO as a "sacrificial goat" (e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) , nor narrowly targeted at the CFO and the audit committee as the leaders most closely associated with the financial reporting process (e.g., suggesting a more "rationally" oriented response).
Interestingly, neither the agents (CEO/CFO) nor the monitors (directors/audit committee members) were spared in the wake of a material financial restatement, as might be argued from an agency theory perspective. Instead, the threat to organizational legitimacy posed by a restatement event appears to be so great that any party directly associated with the corporate governance process is affected. As further evidence, while a director may exit the audit committee and remain on the board, post-hoc analyses reveal that less than one-third of those directors that leave the audit committee remain on the board. The remaining two-thirds of directors leave both the audit committee and the board of directors.
Our efforts to demonstrate finer distinctions in severity among restatement events were less successful. First, we proposed that restatements prompted by sources external to the firm (e.g., auditors or SEC) would be perceived as a more serious threat to regulatory legitimacy, and would therefore lead to higher levels of turnover than restatements prompted from within. Only director turnover was significantly related to restatement prompt, and this relationship was in the opposite direction as predicted. One likely explanation for our lack of results is that we considered material financial restatements only, minimizing the amount of variance in severity to be explained. Alternatively, it could be that once faulty financial information has passed through the entire chain of oversight without detection, that all parties are viewed as equally culpable.
Second, we argued that negative market reactions would be indicative of a greater threat to social legitimacy and would also be associated with higher rates of departure. Here, negative market reactions were significantly related to CFO turnover and weakly related to CEO and outside director turnover, but unrelated to audit committee turnover. Again, the materiality of all restatements under consideration may have restricted the range of market responses.
Perhaps the most significant implication of our findings stems from the unique nature of restatements as a form of corporate crisis. In considering the relationship between organizations and their leaders, far more is known about the outcomes generated by leaders than the accountability of leaders for the outcomes they generate. Moreover, what is known about leader accountability is largely derived from studies of performance-based failures (e.g., bankruptcy).
Financial restatements may be issued by firms at all levels of performance, however, as both strong and poor performers benefit from presenting themselves in a better light. Restatements, therefore, provide a unique opportunity to study the effects of corporate failure (Wiesenfeld et al., in press) on organizational legitimacy, independent of the effects of poor financial performance. Indeed, we found that restatement events predicted additional, unique variance in executive and director turnover even when we controlled for firm performance (accounting and market-based measures). This finding supports the generalizability of legitimacy processes to non-performance-based contexts, as predicted by institutional theory. It also suggests that poor performance alone is not a sufficient explanation for what happens in firms experiencing a financial crisis, again in accordance with institutional theory.
Restatements may be further distinguished from other forms of organizational crisis in that they are often directly attributable to managerial agency. Whereas poor performance and bankruptcy may result from honest errors or external environmental factors, a material financial restatement indicates that the leaders of the firm either intentionally altered the firm's financials for personal gain or that they failed to prevent organizational members from doing so. In other words, financial restatements have a lower degree of causal ambiguity, making it easier to pinpoint culpability. 6 A question that remains for future research, then, is whether and how stigmatization processes (Wiesenfeld et al., in press ) differ depending on the perceived accountability of the leadership for organizational outcomes. Our study indicates that financial restatements will provide a fruitful context for that endeavor.
Limitations
As noted previously, we were not able to discern the nature of the observed turnover, and therefore cannot conclusively demonstrate a causal link between restatement events and involuntary job loss as punishment. Inference of causality was also hampered by the fact that legitimacy is a socially constructed phenomenon (Pearson & Clair, 1998) , making it difficult to measure directly. Rather, firms in alignment with their environment are said to have legitimacy, while firms not aligned with their environment (i.e., those experiencing some form of organizational crisis) do not (Massey, 2001) . On a practical level, this means that restatement firms were likely engaging in "improper" accounting practices for some time prior to the events in this study, with no apparent legitimacy damage. Only when the extent and spread of the accounting irregularities became publicly known, and when such irregularities were publicly condemned by regulators and other stakeholders, did these accounting practices constitute a 6 We would nevertheless note that the data do not permit us discern whether the executives or directors were directly involved in-or even knew about-the specific actions associated with the restatement events. For example, we are not able to deduce whether or not a given CEO gave an order to inflate the firm's "true" revenues in a given year. We are also unable to tell how long leaders actually knew about the misstated earnings prior to the restatement event. In response to this dilemma, companies are increasingly conducting their own corporate investigations (e.g., Reid, Banes, De Ghenghi, & Garner, 2005). threat to organizational legitimacy. Accordingly, we could only infer the presence or lack of legitimacy from indirect evidence (i.e., regulator, stakeholder, and company reactions) of a shift in the institutional logic underlying what constitutes proper accounting practices.
Directions for Future Research
This study provides a foundation for further investigations of the relationship between material financial restatements and organizational legitimacy. For example, we suspect that the legitimacy/stigmatization process may be more complex than a straightforward relationship between organizational crisis and legitimacy defense and repair. Adopting this more streamlined model facilitated our work as a first foray into this line of research, but future studies that examine potential moderators of this relationship are likely to prove fruitful. As an example, Wiesenfeld (1993) found that the visibility of the crisis was a key determinant of loss of CEO prestige for firms filing bankruptcy. Similarly, Wiesenfeld et al. (in press) suggest that the social capital of strategic leaders moderates the degree to which these individuals experience personal loss. Cohen and Dean (2005) operationalized social capital (or top management team [TMT] legitimacy) as prior TMT experience, prior industry experience, and age, and found that these measures were related to stock underpricing in IPO firms. Alternatively, social capital may come in the form of "celebrity" 7 (e.g., Hayward, Rindova, & Pollock, 2004) , where officers/directors who have established relationships with media outlets are able to use these connections to mitigate the negative effects of the restatement (e.g., Suchman, 1995) . As such, responses to restatement events may present an interesting new twist to an old agency problem: do strategic leaders use their media connections to save themselves through, or apart from, the firm?
7 Alternatively, celebrity may have the opposite effect (i.e., highlighting leaders as targets), as demonstrated by the 2005 firing of Carlton S. Fiorina as CEO of Hewlett-Packard (Lavelle, 2005) .
Another important question is whether the stigmatization incurred by strategic leaders persists over time. It may be, for instance, that the executives and directors of restatement firms are not only punished through job loss, but also continue to face difficulties when seeking new employment opportunities (e.g., Gilson, 1989) . While our study examines the extent to which the leaders leave the internal job market, future work may examine the extent to which the external labor market continues to punish these individuals (i.e., the relationship between internal and external "settling up" processes). According to Wiesenfeld et al. (in press) , the ability of these individuals to locate subsequent employment is likely to be directly related to the magnitude of the restatement event. Moreover, association with a financial restatement might also negatively impact quality of subsequent employment. Stigmatized officers may end up accepting positions with smaller and less prestigious employers, while stigmatized board members may find themselves on fewer and less prestigious boards.
It is also not yet known whether strategic leaders who manage to maintain their positions suffer other consequences as a result of their association with a restatement event. In particular, how are their remuneration packages affected? Do CEOs and CFOs associated with financial restatements receive smaller pay increases in subsequent years? Are their bonuses withheld? Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) , for example, found that CEOs of bankrupt firms who did not lose their jobs often faced substantial cuts in compensation. Again, financial restatements provide a unique opportunity to test this proposition while controlling for firm performance.
Finally, although we accurately predicted the likelihood of executive and director turnover as an organizational response to a financial restatement, not enough time has yet elapsed to determine whether these changes had the intended effect -namely, to signal the firm's intention to redress the causes of the restatement and to re-establish the firm's legitimacy in the eyes of key external constituents. If the new leadership does not introduce wide-sweeping reforms that address the root of the problem, then it is possible that the turnover represents quite literally a change "in name only". We encourage future research that follows these firms over an extended period in order to gain a better understanding of which governance reforms are most effective, and under what circumstances. More specifically, what are the underlying differences between firms that experience a restatement followed by wide-scale turnover and then:
1) thoroughly recover from the crisis; 2) recover but continue to exist under a shadow of distrust; or 3) flounder for several subsequent years in spite of executive and/or director change and ultimately cease to exist? We suspect that companies following the first of these pathways will be those most adept at creating a true "enterprise" strategy (Ansoff, 1979; Newman, 1979) .
Conclusion
The basic premise of this study is that restatements represent a significant threat to organizational legitimacy that requires a decisive response (e.g., removal of the stigmatized leaders) by the organization in order to protect its access to key resources. Consistent with this premise, we found that CEOs, CFOs, outside directors, and audit committee members are more likely to lose their jobs following a restatement announcement when compared to their counterparts in a sample of control firms. The magnitude of the difference in turnover rates between the restatement versus control firms, as well as the fact that turnover was observed among all proposed leadership groups, further underscores the threat that material financial restatements pose to strategic leaders in the current business environment. It remains for future research to determine whether removing the tainted leadership is an effective strategy for deflecting the negative effects of restatements on the firms themselves. a Because we were able to determine the month of executive turnover, the dependent variable for the Cox models is measured as time to executive exit. b Models 3-6 were tested relying only on the restatement firms, as these were tests of differences among restatement firms and not between restatement and control firms. a Models 3-6 were tested relying only on the restatement firms, as these were tests of differences among restatement firms and not between restatement and control firms.
